ABSTRACT
It is often held that objective consequentialism is not action-guiding because we often do not know which consequences our actions will have in the long run. The chapter presents an analysis of this criticism and argues for the following claims. (i) The problem alluded to by many critics of objective consequentialism, which I call the problem of decision-guidance, consists in agents (who accept and understand objective consequentialism) not knowing how to decide because they cannot ascribe (what according to objective consequentialism are) ought-making, right-making, or wrong-making features to the actions available to them in concrete situations. (ii) The problem concerns not only objective consequentialism but also subjective consequentialism and other moral theories. (iii) Moral theories must be supplementable with decision procedures to avoid the problem. Finally, the chapter illustrates how the problem of decision-guidance differs from other problems concerning the action-guidingness of moral theories.
