ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that objective consequentialism is compatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. The chapter begins by presenting Frances Howard-Snyder’s argument to the effect that objective consequentialism is incompatible with “ought” implies “can”. Howard-Snyder’s argument is based on a thought experiment in which the agent needs to win a chess championship by defeating Karpov in order to produce the best consequences. Erik Carlson has raised two objections against Howard-Snyder’s argument. Before turning to these objections, the chapter investigates how the success of Howard-Snyder’s arguments depends on theories of abilities and positions regarding the relation between knowing-that and knowing-how. The chapter criticizes the objections put forward by Carlson but argues that an objection closely related to one of Carlson’s objections eventually rebuts Howard-Snyder’s argument. As a result, our understanding of objective consequentialism is improved. Objective consequentialism’s claim that an act is obligatory if and only if it has better consequences than any alternative does not state a moral duty (to do what has better consequences than any alternative). Rather, objective consequentialism states necessary and sufficient conditions for when acts are obligatory. The difference between these statements is elaborated in terms of fine-grained and coarse-grained accounts of act individuation.
