ABSTRACT
The neo-behaviourist or stimulus–response (S–R) theories, which the authors shall be dealing with in the part, are, in many ways, the descendants of classical empiricism. S–R theorists wish to do away with all notions involving intentionality. Indeed, under the influence of empiricist epistemology, they tend to believe that these notions are not genuine empirical concepts, and cannot be given a definite empirical sense unless operationally defined. The present approach does not deny the molar reality of purposive acts of intelligence, of insight, of goals, of intents, of strivings, or of value; on the contrary, the people insist upon the genuineness of these forms of behaviour. One of the cardinal features of the behaviour of animate organisms which has to be accounted for in any explanatory theory is learning, the capacity of the organism to adapt its behaviour to a new environment as a result of its experience of this environment.
