ABSTRACT
Maritime-ness rests on geography, on the popular consciousness, on economic potential, on the extent of overseas territorial interests, on the use that is or can be made of the sea for strategic deterrence, and, even, on the expectation of other states that one’s own will act in a maritime way. But at the back of maritime-ness, in the strategic context, must be the extent to which vital interests are maritime or can be secured by maritime means. For strategy must be a whole, and the maritime side of it must serve the whole and not unduly distort it. The mismatch between what one would like to be able to do as a nation-state, a strategic entity, and what one’s resources will allow one to do is the central dilemma for the medium power. The dilemma is not at all confined to the maritime scene. Germany, with hugely powerful Group of Soviet Forces Germany facing her, confronts it in stark form.
