ABSTRACT
There are several ways in which a nihilist position, or something approximating to it, might be defended. And if reductivism is incoherent, the refutation of realism amounts to a proof of nihilism: it establishes a priori that there is no physical world. Given that reductivism has to take the phenomenalistic form, it may be wondered whether the difference between it and nihilism is of much importance. On the face of it, there is only a marginal difference between this position (let us call it phenomenalistic nihilism) and reductive phenomenalism. The phenomenalistic nihilist looks at the status of physical theory from the viewpoint of the underlying reality. So, the choice between reductivism and nihilism is not inconsequential epistemologically. Nor, indeed, is the real choice between reductive phenomenalism and phenomenalistic nihilism. Not only is the choice between reductivism and nihilism important epistemologically, but also, for that reason, we have a vested interest in preserving reductivism, if we can.
