ABSTRACT
The chapter summarises the main findings of the book. Our aim was to test the relation between the symmetry of the crisis and cooperation and to answer one chief research question: did the EU perform well as a crisis manager in the early stages of the pandemic crisis? The ‘crisis-reform thesis’, that is, the idea that crises prompt substantial change, was equally addressed. Our findings partially confirm the idea that symmetry fosters cooperation. After an early period of invisibility, characterised by member states’ unilateral responses, the EU emerged as the coordinator of crisis response. In the contest between winners and losers the European Commission and the European Council appear in the first group, whereas the European Parliament seems to be in the last, in part due to the ‘crisification’ of the decision-making process. In economic matters the European Central Bank maintained its proactive stance. On the question of change, the pandemic highlighted fragilities in EU’s preparedness and response capacity, opening the door for reforms in several policy areas affected by the pandemic crisis, that if implemented could result in ‘more’ Europe.
