ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the induction and concept combination desiderata. To the best of my knowledge, there are no moral concepts studies on concept combination or induction, but I still infer that my overall theory can handle these desiderata. For, it has been well documented that prototypes, exemplars, and theories in varying circumstances generally can do much of the work for standard concrete concepts in concept combination and induction cases, where each kind of knowledge can work individually or conjointly depending on the situation. Also, in order to explain moral categorization, my previous chapters showed the need for prototype, exemplar, and theory structures, inter alia. Hence, we may draw an inference based on theoretical simplicity that at least prototypes, exemplars, and theories in various circumstances also do the specified work for moral concepts in moral concept combination and induction. I then discuss how emotions can participate in combination and induction. All in all, I empirically prove that our moral concepts can store four different kinds of knowledge, where each kind of knowledge generally can be used individually or conjointly in moral cognition depending on the situation. This pluralistic theory can best explain the desiderata for a theory of moral concepts as compared to any monistic theory of moral concepts alone, such as the prototype view.
