ABSTRACT
One element of the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate is that cognitivists generally contend that moral judgments express beliefs while non-cognitivists generally claim that moral judgments express conative states. Only this particular element of the debate is discussed in this chapter. Since concepts are the building blocks of thought, where moral judgments like KILLING IS WRONG are built up in part with moral concepts like WRONG and moral concepts are constituted by both cognitive and non-cognitive states, I conclude in favor of a qualified hybrid position that moral judgments express both states since moral judgments are constituted by such states. Although there are variants of it, motivational judgment internalists generally maintain that there is a necessary connection between making a sincere moral judgment and at least having some degree of motivation to act on the judgment. Externalists deny this necessary connection. I claim that my theory of moral concepts, which includes motivating emotional states and dispositions to feel emotions, leads to a specified internalist position. This section then addresses objections that may be made by those who take an a priori method to these subjects.
