ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the various theories in the concepts literature. I then take these theories and convert or alter them so they can account for moral features and be applicable to the moral domain. The classical theory for moral concepts claims that such mental representations are constituted by concepts that refer to the necessary and sufficient conditions of being a member of the corresponding moral category. Influenced by Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance for moral concepts, the prototype view holds that such concepts are constituted by cognitive representations of the statistically frequent virtues, basic rules, reasons for action, and/or features of moral situations found in members of a class. This cluster of conceptual constituents is not taken to refer to necessary and sufficient conditions. The exemplar view for moral concepts claims that such concepts are constituted by cognitive representations of particular acts or persons that do not refer to necessary and sufficient conditions. I also argue that the theory-theory for moral concepts claims that concepts are constituted by theories or cognitive representations of master moral principles in normative ethical theories that are not used as necessary and sufficient conditions in moral cognition. The final view is the conative theory, where moral concepts are such things as sentiments, emotions, and/or desires.
