ABSTRACT
Behaviorism (and common sense) makes a sharp division between three domains: Domain 1, is the entirely private domain of qualia. Domain 2 is the public domain of brain physiology. Domain 3 is the public domain of intersubjectively verifiable whole-organism behavior. Science, which is public knowledge, can only deal with domains 2 and 3. But this does not mean that phenomena commonly labeled as “conscious” lie outside behavioristic psychology. I have shown by example that many apparently puzzling effects, from color phi through visual blind spots, to the so-called binding problem either vanish or pose answerable scientific questions when regarded in this way. Behavioral science must confine itself to domains 2 and 3 and leave domain 1 to philosophy and literature.
The behaviorism discussed in this book can deal with mentalistic problems like “consciousness” without either ignoring them, obscuring the distinction between what is inside versus what is outside the organism (like radical behaviorism) or confusing what is felt with what can be measured (like some cognitive discussions). The new behaviorism promises to provide theoretical links between behavior and the brain that rest on real understanding rather than on mentalistic presumptions about how brain–behavior relations “must” be arranged.
