ABSTRACT
Classical behaviorism grew out of an increasing impatience with the limitations of introspection. Inspired by Russian physiologist I. P. Pavlov’s studies of the conditioned reflex, J. B. Watson proposed an apparently simple view of psychology that proved irresistible in the early part of the twentieth century. Experimental research on learning in animals was the focus. When Watson left academic psychology, neo-behaviorists Hull and Tolman added a theoretical component and competed for dominance with Skinnerian radical behaviorism for several decades until the rise of cognitive psychology in the late 1960s.
Tolman’s chief interest was in cognitive representation. Hull was interested in the process of learning. Both sought the mechanisms that underlie behavior, even if their emphases were different.
Explanation for most scientists means “theoretical explanation.” Hull and Tolman agreed on this point, although their efforts had only limited success, but for Watson, and later B. F. Skinner, the aim of psychology was different: “prediction and (environmental) control,” essentially unaided by theory.
Watson’s research agenda was essentially atheoretical and is thus scientifically limited. Watson’s successor, B. F. Skinner, also provided an alternative to a theory that was part Baconian fact gathering and part pragmatic epistemology. It also was a scientific outlier. Nevertheless, powerful new experimental methods allowed Skinner’s behaviorism to gain influence.
