ABSTRACT
There is a long tradition of Aristotelian scholarship that embraces the point of view of the philosophy of action: it focuses on the psychological states and rational capacities that are explanatory of deliberation and morally relevant action. The assumption behind this approach is that what actually renders practical reasoning practical is its resulting in our actions. In contrast, any sort of reasoning about practical matters that is not closely tied up with our actual motives and actions is categorized as non-practical or theoretical. The present book means to distance itself from this tradition, for the latter has only paid lip service to crucial aspects of Aristotle’s practical philosophy and, hence, significantly impoverished its richness. The aim of the book is to demonstrate that Aristotle does not at all restrict practical reason to its action-guiding role; in positive terms, it is to lay bare practical reason’s scope. To explain why restoring the true scope of practical reason is philosophically important, it will bring into the foreground of Aristotle’s practical philosophy five notions of Aristotle’s Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric that have previously been either consigned to oblivion or undervalued: the spectator, the legislator, prayer, hope, and radical evil.
