ABSTRACT
Two different forms of deflationism are taken up, namely the redundancy theory and minimalism. Apart from the well-known objection to the redundancy theory, several new arguments against this theory are proposed and discussed; among the conclusion reached is that even if the truth predicate is redundant the falsity predicate isn’t. There is then a longer discussion of Horwhich’s version of minimalism. It is argued that under the referential theory truth may be taken to be a deflationary notion, only on the condition that the same is also the case for the notion of reference. Two aspects which may make a notion deflationary are then distinguished; the notion not being a naturalist one, and the notion having a minimal function in our use of language. It is argued even if truth is not a naturalistic notion, it does not follow that it plays a minimal role in language. The minimalist account of falsity is then criticized, concluding that all the deflationary accounts of falsity appeal to our more general notion of sentential negation, and that a deflationary account of negation cannot be given.
