ABSTRACT
This chapter asks the question, ‘how does the Chinese government reassert its control and management of societies to its overall counterterrorism strategy by forging an instrumental and pragmatic, rather than ideological, collaboration with the inhabitants of local communities, ethnic elites and local cadres to (re)produce a perception of legitimacy among the local communities of Xinjiang?’ I identify and examine two crucial ‘micro-apparatuses’ of counterterrorism in China, and in Xinjiang, especially—grassroots officials and mosques (or imams)—and their interactions with local inhabitants in the context of counterterrorism and counter-radicalization. This chapter argues that the public performance of ‘stability’ and ‘counterterrorism’ has become a means of professional advancement and/or survival for local cadres. The chapter finds that the local (cadres and ethnic inhabitants in Xinjiang) pursuance of safety and security often produces the low-profile forms of resistance against counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang cases, burdened with their highly complex geopolitical make-up, face significant challenges in restoring a public space that supports the counterterrorism collaboration between state and community. It further finds that China’s strategy of deradicalization is characterized by public health approaches.
