ABSTRACT
Because assumptions about the mind-body relation and the nature of desire, emotion, and cognition shape understandings of agency, theorizing about autonomy can be enriched by insights from philosophy of mind. Enactivist notions of autonomy and adaptive sense-making, in particular, help to conceptualize the way in which autonomous agency centrally involves the formation and ongoing modification of habits. Via learning and socialization, agents become selectively attuned to their surroundings, develop a concerned point of view, and form recurring patterns of engagement and skillful response. These habitual patterns of behavior and attention can be understood as affective framing patterns that reflect what agents care about and enable them to engage meaningfully with their surroundings. Habits overlap and become integrated with other habits, so that they form a bundle; and different “bundles of habits” are enacted depending on the situation. These organized patterns of behavior and attention can be understood as regional identities that simultaneously allow for both stability and control, as well as flexibility and reasons-responsiveness. That is, this dual stability and flexibility enables agents to both (a) form a relatively coherent, enduring character, and (b) modify the way that they engage with relevant affordances, in response to changing circumstances.
