ABSTRACT
The concluding chapter considers what implications this enactivist account of agent autonomy has for moral responsibility, legal accountability, and mental health practices. It is important to acknowledge that although the exercise of autonomy is impaired in cases of mental disorder, the capacity for autonomous agency does not disappear altogether. To determine the extent to which someone is morally and legally responsible, we need to examine whether and to what extent their symptoms interfered with effective agency at a particular time. In the legal realm, efforts to hold agents accountable should focus on rehabilitation and the restoration of autonomy rather than punishment. Enactivism and its associated emphasis on relational autonomy push us toward a restorative justice approach, one which views crime primarily as a violation of people and relationships rather than as a defiance of government authority. In treatment settings, holistic methods that incorporate environmental scaffolding and body-based interventions are needed to strengthen agent’s capacities for self-control and self-determination. The imposition of coercive forms of treatment, such as forced medication or involuntary hospitalization, constitutes a failure to recognize and respect patients as autonomous agents. Instead, health care providers should acknowledge and cultivate patients’ epistemic agency by involving them in treatment decisions.
