ABSTRACT
This chapter reconstructs the decision-making leading to the formation of SEATO. Firstly, developments in Indochina, especially Vietnam, have garnered serious concerns in the United States about the communist threat and its “domino effect”. This had propelled the United States to reiterate calls for a regional security arrangement. However, the subsequent memorandum reflected the commitment problems of some signatory states other than the United States, especially pertaining to military intervention should it be necessary. Globally, support for US initiatives had ranged from fully supportive to neutral and against. The existence of SEATO itself was also viewed by states like India to be a tacit alliance with Pakistan against it. At the end of 1954, India and Indonesia formally stated that they would not support the SEATO. It also appeared unlikely that Ceylon and Burma would join. The only Asian countries that were committed to join were Thailand and the Philippines. Even after SEATO was finally established in 1954, the treaty was a compromised one, where different agendas of states were codified. Problems with the nature of SEATO continue to persist, as United States was reluctant to commit to land warfare and where certain states like Thailand demanded a NATO-like military alliance.
