ABSTRACT
This chapter revisits the early years of SEATO from 1955 to 1958, which was devoted to the unfinished business of sorting the operational details of the Manila Pact. Despite its establishment, the Pact was a compromised one with no clear direction as to when, how, and what operations should be carried out to fulfil its intended goals. There were also commitment problems by the Western powers such as the United States, France, and Britain towards contributing ground troops, despite widespread fear of communist gains in Indochina, Malaya, and Indonesia. This was also critical since the United States anticipated an attack on Laos by North Vietnam and even viewed the Laotian situation as “a test of SEATO”. These factors were very much to the disappointment of the Asian member states, which also led to some like Cambodia questioning the security utility of SEATO itself. Another problem was the lack of capacity on the part of members to deal with SEATO affairs. Next, although economic cooperation was promoted among members as espoused under Article III of SEATO, apart from several projects, there were no concrete programmes to achieve this. Consequently, SEATO's non-military achievements were still overshadowed by its perceived failure in the military dimension.
