ABSTRACT
This chapter revisits Laos to reassess whether SEATO's failure to resolve its domestic political crisis between 1959 and 1962 led to the latter's decline. Following the formation of the new Laotian cabinet in 1959 without Lao Patriotic Front/Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) representation, there was a fear that the North Vietnamese will attack Laos. As such, SEATO came up with a contingency plan to assist Laos in the event of a Communist insurgency. However, commitment by the members was limited since most preferred the use of the UN channel over SEATO. This placed the onus of potential fights on Lao's military. The situation in Laos later culminated in a civil war between the anti-Communist and pro-Communist (supported by the North Vietnamese) factions, where both sides claimed to be the legitimate government. To this end, SEATO also failed to agree on joint action in Laos, to the disappointment of its members, especially Thailand. By 1961, the combined Lao-North Vietnamese forces have already established control over strategic provinces and territories. SEATO remained largely dormant due to a lack of support by the United Kingdom and France for decisive actions and distrust of them by the Asian member states. Moreover, even the United States had begun to reassess SEATO's utility.
