ABSTRACT
Most of the literature that examines Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism and the unique circumstances under which it was implemented criticize the broader aspects of federal–regional state relations and provide reasons for such failures, with some presenting policy directions for possible reforms. One major difference in approach to the topic stands out with the contribution of this work, however. Unlike most prior works on the topic, this book demonstrates how the model of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was exploited as a mechanism for authoritarian survival under the EPRDF coalition’s leadership. With this in mind, this chapter focuses on the issues pertaining to the federal–regional state relationship and how those at the centre used these relations to ensure the political survival of the EPRDF coalition. Moreover, the chapter also shows how the constitutional framework evolved in the last few decades and points to challenges that each attempt at constitutional writing attempted to address, and either succeeded or failed. In this context, it also looks into the constitutions of some of the member states of Ethiopia’s fragile federation: the regional states.
