ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I address objections to cognitivist misanthropy. These include the following: it is not humanity that is morally objectionable but something else (e.g., capitalism); humans are not bad but rather a “mix” of both good and bad; humans are not morally responsible for the ills I have recounted; the common-sense morality on which my argument depends should be rejected; misanthropy is too dangerous to countenance; morality is irrelevant to human affairs; and others. I attempt to answer these objections and show that cognitivist misanthropy survives them. When responding to potential objections, the author always runs the risk of overlooking some incisive objection or presenting it in a weaker light in order to handle it with more ease. It is surely better to respond to actual objections offered by real critics, but because my view has not been defended in the past, this is not an option. Accordingly, I have done my best to anticipate likely objections and to present them in their strongest light.
