ABSTRACT
The introduction lays out the parameters of the study, the first study to examine the various episodes of mass repression under Stalin, not just singularly, but as a pattern that repeated throughout the dictator's rule. There are many studies that recreate individual periods of mass repression, but none that look at the cyclical pattern of similarities and differences of Stalinist violence over the whole course of the dictator's regime. The cyclical nature of Stalinist repression makes up the central focus of this study. A second aspect connects repeated cycles of internal violence to the dictator's perceptions of war and foreign threat. This axis of study—patterns of violence tied to external threat—goes to the core argument of the book: that we should take Stalin's repeated concerns about war seriously, not just as calculated ploys to mobilize the population, undermine rivals, or to otherwise consolidate political power. Though often wrong, Stalin nonetheless believed in and acted on his perceptions of threat, driven by a combination of Marxist ideology and an innate tendency to see conspiracy everywhere. The introduction outlines the series of crisis periods, which correspond to the several chapters: 1928–1932, 1936–1939, the Great Fatherland War, and the last war crisis period, 1947–1953. Periods of violence peaked and ebbed but, in each case, they were linked to Stalin's expectation of war and invasion, to his perceived need for urgent internal mobilization, and to intense foreign policy activity. The introduction highlights the importance of the revolutionary war era, especially the war with Poland in 1920, as a key to understanding how Stalin reacted to perceived crises later as undisputed ruler.
