ABSTRACT
In the twelve days and nights from the night of October 23rd to November 4th, a German-Italian army, heavily outnumbered in men, overwhelmingly inferior in armour, artillery, ammunition and equipment of all kinds, deficient in petrol, and denied manoeuvre or reinforcement, inflicted severe casualties in men and armour on the British army commanded by General Montgomery. Four times the British attacks were fought to a standstill. Moreover, although halted in the midst of successful disengagement and withdrawal, and compelled by order of Adolf Hitler to stand and fight in the Alamein positions, the German commander again succeeded in extricating remnants of his army, to evade his pursuers and to fight successful rearguard actions to the frontiers of Tunisia. The second battle of Alamein was a battle of attrition, a ‘Passchendaele with armour’, a battle without hope for the enemy, and in which the victors could afford to trade life, arms and armour at more than four to one.
