ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the Atoms for Peace period through the lens of the collective action framework. Of particular interest here is the question of why the initiative proceeded without an effective system of control and why only limited item-specific safeguards were adopted instead of broader comprehensive safeguards? The chapter begins by exploring the nature of the Atoms for Peace initiative, including its purpose and scope. Drawing on materials from a variety of archives, it explores the negotiation of the safeguards arrangements that became associated with the initiative. The decision of France to transfer a reactor and reprocessing capability to Israel is examined, as is how the controls affected India’s nuclear programme.
In applying the research framework, it is found that so-called core factors, such as a lack of trust among key parties, affected cooperation between the Superpowers in this period. Additionally, the non-proliferation norm – to the extent such a thing existed – was limited to the non-misuse of supplied technology (i.e., peaceful uses). The chapter shows that the effect of this was limited, however, as at least some countries entered into nuclear supply agreements despite knowing of the weapons interest of recipients. The French transfer of a reactor to Israel comes primarily to mind in this respect.
