ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the evolution of non-proliferation trade controls following the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 to Pakistan’s announcement in the mid-1980s that it had enriched uranium to over 90%. The primary reason that trade controls were not advanced further during this period, despite cooperation between the Superpowers, is that the vested interests of other states involved in the negotiations – notably states within the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and India – worked against this. These states exercised their influence to prevent the development of a more rigorous system of technology control because of a concern that this would have negatively affected their own nuclear programmes.
In examining this episode through the research framework, it is shown that structural factors aligned to allow for limited cooperation in this period but overcoming core factors proved difficult, which meant that states would only agree not to assist others in acquiring nuclear weapons. Even when this geostrategic interest in non-proliferation was recognised, developing trust-based relationships proved difficult allowing for only slow and incremental progress. As in the Atoms for Peace era, non-proliferation ultimately proved to be a secondary geostrategic objective for the US, which was primarily focused on Cold War competition.
