ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the evolution of non-proliferation trade controls after the end of the Cold War in the particular context of the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme. This includes examination of the improvements in international trade controls, particularly through the reconstitution of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the creation of an NSG dual-use regime, and the adoption of the IAEA’s additional protocol.
The main argument here is that the Iraq episode prompted an improvement of international trade controls, but the improvements were too limited in scope to address the proliferation risks of nuclear-related trade more generally.
It is shown that there are a number of practical and political reasons that ad hoc and voluntary measures were favoured over universal and treaty-based measures. Principal among these was the priority assigned to securing the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Securing agreement for an indefinite extension of the NPT was given priority over other nuclear non-proliferation initiatives, including in relation to trade control issues. The result was that enhanced controls were enacted on an ad hoc basis often by likeminded countries rather than a universal fashion.
