ABSTRACT
Conversion is the term traditionally used to refer to those who move from one religion to another (e.g., from Christianity to Islam or from Hinduism to Buddhism), though interestingly one is never imagined as converting from a religion to atheism, something that is instead called “leaving religion” or “leaving one’s religion.” In addition, we might also note that while a person may well be called a “convert” in their new community, traditionally they are often pejoratively referred to as “apostates” in their old tradition. The latter term derives from the ancient Greek for one who “stands off,” i.e., rebels or defects. Both terms, then, are ways to identify individuals or groups often with distinct political and social ramifications. Though people certainly convert to another religion for a variety reasons (e.g., reported to have been caused by a spiritual calling or, perhaps, for the sake of a marriage), we tend to romanticize the idea—especially in North America and Europe—where there is an emphasis put on the individual choice and personal autonomy, in which case conversion is said to have been done for some sort of intensely personal religious reason or reasons. Rarely, for example, do we want to talk—at least in the academic study of religion—about coercion or forced conversion; nor, for that matter, do we want to talk about the social gain and prestige brought about by conversion. For example, people rarely convert to religions in which they lose social capital. The modern emphasis on the social actor as inherently autonomous and therefore weighing options and making choices may overlook various structural factors that, despite what practitioners themselves may report, may shed light on conversion not being about spirituality, doctrine, or beliefs as much as we may think.
