ABSTRACT
This chapter deals with a perennial question in the philosophy of religion: How can divine foreknowledge be reconciled with human freedom? That is, if God knows today what you will choose tomorrow, you necessarily choose as God foreknows. But if your choice happens necessarily, then you are not free. AAA insist that God knows future events and that human beings have free will. Augustine points out that the “necessity” involved in foreknowledge is not the “necessity” that conflicts with free will. Boethius (480–524 CE) adds that God “sees” all events from His perspective in eternity. But Boethius concludes that God foreknows all events because He is going to cause them. Anselm, given his libertarian analysis of free will, holds that God knows future free choices because they are immediately present to His eternity. This motivates an “isotemporal” (four-dimensional, eternalist) view of time on which all times exist equally, and past, present, and future are subjective. Aquinas may or may not be an isotemporalist. As a compatibilist he can embrace Boethius's claim that God knows future events because He intends to cause them.
