ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on dominant foreign policy frameworks, and particularly on existing frameworks surrounding pragmatism and their gaps. By contrast, Walter A. McDougall emphasised (and condemned) the role of Christianity in shaping US foreign policy, seeing strategy as strongly influenced by religious ideology, creating positions based on delusions of grandeur and a sentiment of having been “chosen” by God. However, McDougall does little to distinguish this tendency from other claims to exceptionalism expressed by other successful hegemonic powers in the past, or delve extensively into the pragmatic advantages to be gained through possession of a unifying ideology. Historically, tough measures against China have tended to be ineffective in achieving their aims, simply because of China’s ability to absorb all but most extreme foreign sanctions with relative equanimity. While the Johnson administration adopted relatively hard-line rhetoric in addressing China’s role in Vietnam – despite real-world uncertainty concerning the precise extent of Chinese involvement – Nixon took a much more conciliatory approach.
