ABSTRACT

This chapter shows how various presidents have – with many a noble phrase and an intransigent, aquiline stare – set out their ideological principles on the campaign trail, only to walk them back (or have them walked back by Congress and the judiciary) once in office. Indeed, Reagan can be considered in many ways to exemplify the phenomena associated with US pragmatism, with his clear swing from Small-P pragmatism during the agenda-setting stage, to Big-P pragmatism during the policy formulation and implementation stages, impelled by the weight of the forthcoming evaluation stage at the ballot box. Conversely, the “pivot to Asia” was a strategy that appeared to be indicated as necessary by the circumstances, but which attracted almost no interest domestically. The Trump administration, on the other hand, was less preoccupied with small shifts in the polling needle, but had to contend with determined opposition on the part of Congress (occasionally) and the foreign policy establishment.