ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 sets the scene for this book. First, there is a ‘big picture’ discussion of the ‘UK executive pay problem’ and the part this plays in the ‘responsible capitalism’ debate – outlining two contrasting stances: (1) ‘executive pay is far too high, plus out of kilter between top management and staff generally’, and (2) ‘executive pay levels have actually stabilised since the Global Financial Crisis’. The latter does not imply for a moment that the present situation is Panglossianly perfect (it readily accepts the need for further reform, particularly in relation to ‘incentive arrangements’, ‘short-termism’, ‘corporate behaviour/ethics’ and ‘fair pay’), but argues that – with the exception of certain notable FTSE 100 outliers – the overall position has actually improved since the introduction of the UK’s 2013 executive pay regulation reforms. Second, the relevant UK hard and soft law regulation concerning executive remuneration is discussed. Third, the role and activities of executive remuneration consultants (and their in-house counterparts) are considered – detailing the respective roles they play in remuneration committee pay determination processes and explaining why an examination of the ‘professional standards’ of executive remuneration consultants is an important subject (not just in academic terms but also in respect of UK remuneration practice). Fourth, the author explains why he undertook his doctoral research programme on such professional standards (which forms the topic of this book), what he aimed to achieve and his hypothesis that any changes to the present regulatory regime applicable to executive remuneration consultants are unwarranted. This book’s conclusion is that the author’s hypothesis is proven and that the burden of justifying any proposals for further changes in this regard lies on those who may make these.
