ABSTRACT
Chapter 2 sets out the relevant UK executive director remuneration package figures since the 2007/2008 GFC, arguing that ‘executive pay is stabilising/reducing’ proponents would appear to have the data in their favour. There are, though, FTSE 100 ‘outliers’ in particular that have caused very justifiable concern. There is then the discussion of the UK long-term incentives trend for LTIPs to be replaced by restricted share arrangements, with the latter de-emphasising performance conditions in return for lower award values (reflecting more certainty of outcome) and longer retention/holding periods. Value Creation Plans – such as the ones respectively applicable at Persimmon and Ocado – are also discussed. The author’s research interview programme of 53 protagonists on the UK executive pay scene is described, together with the 18 research aspects covered in the semi-structured qualitative interviews. The interviewees’ comments in respect of the first five research topics (namely the UK executive remuneration scene, whether there should be a shareholders’ binding vote on the appointment of a remuneration committee advisory firm and/or a shareholders’ annual binding vote on the Directors’ Remuneration Report, CEO pay ratio disclosure and Workers on the Board) are covered in the remainder of Chapter 2.
