ABSTRACT
The German blow on Sunday, February 14, a carefully conceived operation involving Kesselring, Arnim, and Rommel, had its ambiguous aspects. If at the beginning of the month Arnim was pleased with his success at the passes of the Eastern Dorsale, Rommel, who was backing his Panzerarmee into the Mareth positions, and Kesselring, who was coordinating the armies in Tunisia, were less than satisfied. The presence of American tanks around Sbeitla and Gafsa bothered Rommel. In February, after Arnim’s success at Faid and Pichon, Rommel returned to his idea. Kesselring transmitted the memo to Comando Supremo for decision. The upshot of the conversation was a decision to execute a small operation. There would be two attacks, both limited in nature. Without the slightest inkling that the operation was about to start, Kesselring left Rome that evening of the 13th — only a few hours before the opening of the attack — to visit Hitler in East Prussia.
