ABSTRACT
When people think of moral philosophy or ethics, they have in mind theories or conceptual models that guide us to what is right or good, and what we ought to do (or avoid) in a particular situation. That is normative ethics and is covered in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Every normative ethical theory contains implicit meta-ethical assumptions. This chapter discusses some important meta-ethical issues and conflicts, their implications, and their origins in moral philosophy. Considered are conflicts between: (a) subjectivism (a phenomenological perspective) versus objectivist perspectives (there are moral truths that are knowable, such as in ethical naturalism and religion); and (b) egoism (it is right/best for each to pursue their self-interest) versus universalism (no person's or group's interests are a priori of greater value than any others’ and all are to be considered—barring justifiable exceptions). Also emphasized is (c) the critical role of ethical reasoning: “moral truths are matters of reason; a moral judgment is true if it is backed by better reasons than the alternatives”; and (d) the principle of universalizability—the consistency of moral judgments in a situation irrespective of who is the protagonist. Competent ethical choices depend on right-reasoning, universalism and universalizability.
