ABSTRACT
From its inception, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army had been integrating other armed groups operating in Southern Sudan. Due to an imperative to reduce the threat that non-SPLA armed groups posed to stability in the aftermath of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, this approach became formalised through the signing of the Juba Declaration in 2006, which allowed it the short-term stability to consolidate power in the runup to the 2011 referendum on self-determination. Following a series of political crises, newly independent South Sudan collapsed into civil war in December 2013 and parts of the SPLA fractured into warring factions. This introductory chapter posits that the Government of South Sudan’s decision to largely reach a political-military accommodation with such groups through integration into the SPLA was the option with the fewest adverse implications. However, considering the long-term outcomes of this approach, this chapter outlines three questions that will be answered throughout the course of this book:
Why did the Government of South Sudan choose to accommodate armed groups after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed?
Why did this attempt to accommodate armed groups ultimately fail?
What are the wider lessons that can be drawn from South Sudan’s attempt at accommodating armed groups during its aborted transition from war to peace?
