ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that, in light of the divisions that permeated the southern resistance during the civil war and the goal of holding the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011, military integration served a critical purpose in 2006 by preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan. The chapter analyses various rationales behind the government’s decision during the Interim Period to accommodate armed groups, as formalised by the 2006 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration, but demonstrates how the durability of the integration process proved vulnerable to the deterioration of the political atmosphere in South Sudan. Despite the government’s short-term successes, the underlying factors that perpetuated the cycle of armed group proliferation – namely legitimate political grievances, opportunism, and greed – remained, leaving the government’s approach to neutralising armed groups open to multiple vulnerabilities. During this timeframe, military integration became de facto open-ended, which increased pressure on the military integration process – especially as rebel leaders became entrepreneurs of rebellion in response. Instead of being a transitional security mechanism during South Sudan’s transition from war to peace, integration became an end in and of itself.
