ABSTRACT

This chapter places the military integration process in the broader context of concurrent efforts to restructure the security sector to transform the SPLA into a conventional military while simultaneously rightsizing the force. However, for reasons that will be discussed in the chapter, none of South Sudan’s demobilisation initiatives was able to play a significant role in rightsizing the SPLA or in its transformation during the Interim Period of the CPA. Consequently, the failure of various initiatives to reduce the parade of the SPLA increased pressure on an already complex military integration process as a means by which to address the actual or latent threats posed by armed groups in South Sudan. Furthermore, there was a disconnect between the military integration process and concurrent defence sector transformation efforts; integration outpaced rightsizing initiatives, and was not considered a departure point for defence sector transformation. This chapter thus demonstrates how efforts to reform the new national military were built on an unstable foundation, making the security sector prone to destabilisation, as was the case during the 2010–11 rebellions, or making it prone to collapse, as was the case during the intra-SPLA tensions leading up to the political rupture that led to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013.