ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses what can be learnt from the case of South Sudan regarding the role military integration plays during war-to-peace transitions:
During such transitions, governments can fight armed groups, ignore them, and accept that they lack a monopoly on the use of force within the country, or seek political-military accommodation with them through military integration. In some cases, integration can be the ‘least bad’ option.
The combination of an open-ended integration process and failed demobilisation initiatives can increase pressure on the military integration process.
A disconnect between the military integration process and broader defence sector reform efforts can contribute to the security sector being rebuilt on an unstable foundation.
A de facto open-ended military integration process can make it more difficult for a military to focus on cohesion and professionalisation, which risks making the force prone to fracturing during periods of heightened political competition.
Military power-sharing arrangements cannot overcome failed political accommodation efforts, and can even become more vulnerable as political power-sharing arrangements erode.
Although integration may help warring parties temporarily overcome wartime factionalism and avert conflict in the short term, the process can even contribute to instability if the process is not well-implemented as a transitional security mechanism.
