ABSTRACT
In this chapter, Seiberth presents an encompassing interpretation of Sellars' theory of perceptual experience. He articulates how the requisite theoretical elements interact in perceiving objects as actual. This entails accounting for the role of the in itself, the status of sense impressions, empirical and transcendental schemata, and the influence of image models on the contents of intuitions. On the basis of this reconstruction, Seiberth explicates the demonstrative component of Kantian intuitions as an invariant feature of our intentional relation to a world with regard to which we are sensorily receptive or passive. However, Sellars is shown to treat the current framework of experiencing the world as itself evolving and therefore as inherently unstable. The Manifest conception of empirically real objects is argued to be under pressure for reasons internal to the framework of common sense. Seiberth shows how this motivates Sellars to formulate an alternative account of intentionality for Kantian objects of experience.
