ABSTRACT
In this chapter, Seiberth discusses the status of picturing in Sellars' account of finite knowing dialectically by confronting it with longstanding and recent objections from neopragmatism and expressivism. He argues that the relationship between Sellars' nominalistic, or expressivist leanings and his commitments to scientific realism can be resolved when framed in light of his transcendental methodology. Far from adhering to a scientific prejudice, Sellars is shown to stress the immanent and thoroughly pragmatic character of assessments of scientific progress. Seiberth reads Sellars as maintaining that we can challenge singled-out areas and claims in related frameworks, and even of our own framework, but not all at once. Holding that an Archimedean point of view is unavailable from which to evaluate the correctness of knowledge claims means that we assess a given region of theory-production and immanent knowledge from the viewpoint of a further region. Thus, our articulation of the material contents we purport to be intentionally related to always depends on transcendentally identified categorial-inferential features of the framework we theorise in and live by.
