ABSTRACT
This chapter illustrates how in developing contexts disaster response is a functional cooperation that is used to advance the interests of different players. Different players emerged to fill in the gap left by the weak state. While, as argued in Chapter 2, the emergency relief responses of humanitarian organizations should be based on human rights and on the principle of “do no harm”, and on impartiality, irrespective of economic or political purposes, this chapter illustrated that assistance is mostly based on strategic and political reasons and is usually dominated by economic concerns. This international assistance has highlighted the weakness of the Lebanese state that is tainted with corruption, linking foreign assistance with reform strategies, and directing the assistance to NGOs and actors providing support on the ground. Based on interviews with experts in international relations theories and civil society actors involved in direct response on the ground, this chapter demonstrates that international assistance and foreign aid are mainly based on strategic, political, diplomatic, and geostrategic reasons and are dominated by economic concerns: international donors, mainly states, took into considerations their own benefits and agendas when responding to disasters. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates how some international aid emphasized the failure of the affected governments in managing disasters and how the reliance on these international donors would lead to limited commitment on the part of the affected state and weak governance of local institutions.
