ABSTRACT

In the previous chapter we found how the theory of Rousseau easily developed into political absolutism, when we followed out the arguments which have led idealists to make the State the real liberator of man’s moral nature, the single and dominant goal of his life, the supreme and unique focus of his loyalty and affection, and the source of all those institutions which differentiate him from the animals, and at the same time satisfy even his animal needs as no animal can ever satisfy them. If we were content to remain within the four corners of this vigorous creed, political authority would require no further defence. Any law which furthered the good of the State would be evidently right; we should legislate up to the hilt to prevent abuses and forward reform; a citizen could never evade the claim of the State to his obedience, nor could he ever rightly pursue any object other than the good of his community. We stated this position continuously and without qualification or misgiving, and we must now examine it point by point and attempt to retain only those elements in it which withstand criticism. This criticism falls under three heads:

Natural Rights and the Liberty of the Individual