ABSTRACT
The current chapter introduces the reader to the concept of the guardian’s dilemma and to the purpose and structure of the book. Although it is usually taken for granted that states united under a common cause have no reason to fear—let alone fight—one another, problems do arise between allies because security dilemmas do not vanish with the mere formation of an alliance. In the event of a crisis, the leading power in the alliance intervenes to prevent war between its own allies—an effort defined here as dual restraint. The guardian’s dilemma lies in the fact that whatever form the dual restraint effort takes, one state is generally dissatisfied with the guardian’s behavior and feels abandoned by its stronger ally, whereas the other state feels affirmed by the guardian’s behavior and is emboldened to further pursue its own interests. The Greek–Turkish–American strategic triangle constitutes a critical case in the examination of the guardian’s dilemma. During the Cold War, Greeks and Turks confronted one another on as many as six occasions, thereby endangering America’s strategic interests. The book examines from a neoclassical-realist standpoint how the United States responded to each Greek–Turkish crisis, for what reasons, and with what results.
