ABSTRACT

Within nine months of the collapse of the Republic of Cyprus in late 1963, Turkey issued four invasion threats and conducted one shelling campaign. Turkey’s first threat of invasion came after the eruption of inter-community violence in December 1963 that marked the beginning of the long crisis. A second threat was issued a few weeks later, as violence in Cyprus continued apace. After the third invasion threat in March 1964, a large U.N. peacekeeping force was deployed to Cyprus—and still remains on the island. Turkey’s fourth invasion threat was halted at the last minute by the strongly worded Johnson Letter delivered to the Turkish Prime Minister in June 1964. Washington’s resolute intervention came as a shock in Ankara, bringing about a serious reconsideration of the orientation of Turkey’s strategic compass. Turning a blind eye to Turkey’s short air campaign in August did nothing but infuriate Greece too. The U.S. failure to deal with the long-simmering Cyprus imbroglio came against a background of heightened tensions between the two superpowers. In the end, large-scale, intra-alliance war was averted, but heavy U.S. involvement caused nothing but dismay in Ankara, defiance in Athens and Nicosia, and disarray along NATO’s Southern flank.