ABSTRACT
The long crisis of 1963–64 left behind it two things: a sense of bitterness in Ankara about Johnson’s letter, and a Greek regiment in Cyprus in excess of the London–Zurich Accords. Another threat of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus emerged after fighting between the two communities broke out in November 1967. The Eastern Mediterranean was once again on the brink of war when indispensable U.S. troubleshooter Cyrus Vance was dispatched to the region to make the Greeks and Turks back down. The major task of U.S. diplomacy was to assure Turkey of continued U.S. support while at the same time maintaining satisfactory relations with the Colonels’ regime in Greece. After intense negotiations, war was averted, even as the Greek contingent was removed from Cyprus. For all the moral dilemmas the Greek Colonels presented to Washington, they were entirely dependent on the United States. Hence, the fear of isolation trumped the feelings of abandonment in Greece. Turkey was appeased but not yet content, while a deadly hatred was nourished between Athens and Nicosia.
