ABSTRACT
The 1974 crisis was the most consequential in the history of the triangular relationship and constitutes a benchmark in Greek–Turkish affairs. The fear of entrapment in the Greek–Turkish impasse proved an insurmountable challenge, as the Watergate-stricken U.S. government proved reluctant to intervene at several turning points. At first, Washington was caught off-guard by the Greek-instigated coup against Makarios, in spite of an abundance of evidence that his overthrow was in the making. It then took limited action to prevent a nearly unstoppable Turkish force from invading and establishing a beachhead in northern Cyprus. Finally, the U.S. government took no decisive action to dissuade the second Turkish invasion, by which Turkey extended its grip to roughly the northern one-third of the island. The worst-case scenario of full-scale war between Greece and Turkey was averted, but the U.S. policy of inertia produced long-lasting side effects: an acrimonious relationship with Greece, disenchantment in Turkey with the Congress-imposed embargo, and an irrevocably divided Cyprus.
