ABSTRACT

This chapter examines theories of consciousness and issues that relate to the scientific study of consciousness. Methodological debates relating to subjective (first-person) measures and objective (third-person) measures of consciousness are considered, as are questions about the reliability of introspection. Here, we consider challenges to first-person methods in consciousness science due to Eric Schwitzgebel and Daniel Dennett. We also consider Ned Block’s argument for phenomenal overflow, and the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and cognitive access. The distinction between levels (global states) of consciousness and the contents of consciousness is examined, as is the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness. We then explore various accounts of consciousness: higher-order thought accounts (defended by David Rosenthal), self-representational accounts (defended by Uriah Kriegel), functionalist accounts (defended by Stanislas Dehaene), neural accounts (identity theories, defended by Ned Block), and representationalist accounts (defended by Michael Tye and Fred Dretske). The chapter also considers neural plasticity, the distinction between cortical dominance and cortical deference (due to Susan Hurley and Alva Noë), and the phenomenal character of moods.