ABSTRACT
This chapter examines accounts of self-knowledge – first-person mindreading. We begin by considering what the scope of self-knowledge is (does it encompass all kinds of mental states, or does it only have a restricted scope?), and its epistemic status (in what sense is it epistemically privileged?). The bulk of the chapter focuses on four influential accounts of self-knowledge, beginning with the traditional inner-sense account. We then examine two accounts of self-knowledge based on the work of Gareth Evans: the inferentialist account (developed by Alex Byrne) and the deliberative account (developed by Richard Moran). The chapter concludes with a discussion of Gilbert Ryle–s account of self-knowledge and the neo-Rylean (or interpretationalist) accounts defended by Alison Gopnik and Peter Carruthers. We consider Gopnik–s appeal to evidence from developmental psychology and Carruthers–s appeal to evidence from social psychology and studies of confabulation. The chapter also discusses expressivist approaches to self-knowledge and the idea that at least some self-knowledge involves a distinctive kind of relation known as acquaintance.
