ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the search for a plausible ‘mark of the mental’ – that is, a criterion that we might use to decide whether an event, state, or property is mental or non-mental. We begin by considering privacy as a mark of the mental. This proposal is found wanting on the grounds that a number of mental phenomena do not appear to exhibit privacy. We then consider Brentano–s thesis, and the idea that intentionality is the mark of the mental. We consider the objection that intentionality is not sufficient for mentality, as well as the objection that intentionality is not necessary for mentality. The distinction between original intentionality and derived intentionality is discussed. We then turn to consciousness, and the question of whether consciousness might serve as a mark of the mental. Various ways of defining consciousness are considered. The contrast between creature consciousness and mental state consciousness is examined, as are the terms ‘qualia’ and ‘phenomenal consciousness’, and the phrase ‘what it–s like’. John Searle–s ‘connection principle’ is introduced and considered. The distinction that Terry Horgan and John Tienson draw between separatist and inseparatist conceptions of the relationship between intentionality and consciousness is considered. The chapter concludes with a discussion of folk psychology. Other topics discussed include: personal and subpersonal explanation and the possibility of brain-reading (or brain-decoding).
