ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the nature of thought. We consider what distinguishes thought from other mental faculties (such as perception), and we consider the distinction between different kinds of thought, such as automatic thought and reflective thought. We look at the difference between thinking and reasoning on the one hand and associating on the other. Tamar Gendler–s notion of alief is discussed. We examine representational (computational) accounts of thought and Jerry Fodor–s language of thought hypothesis, including his systematicity and productivity arguments for it. The chapter also considers alternatives to the language of thought hypothesis from connectionism, and the question of whether material symbols and natural language representations might be crucial to thought. John Searle–s Chinese room argument is discussed. The chapter concludes with an examination of the Turing test and the question of what would be a good test for thought in an artificially intelligent system. The relationship between thought and consciousness is considered.
